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The theory of D. North, J. Wallis and B. Weingast (NWW), namely
rational choice institutionalism, is applied here to Turkish history from
1923 to 1960. Economic rents are considered as the fundamental
mechanisms to stop violence among the powerful groups in order to form
a political unity in the emerging states/developing countries. It is asserted
here that the Republic of Turkey created economic rents through
economic interventionism and centrally planned economy during the
mono-party regime years. Therefore, there are strict relations between the
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Introduction
How economic rents are influential concerning the development
of the political institutions and the political coalitions is an important
subject examined by public choice theory and new institutionalism.
Public choice discovers new dimensions of political corruption by
showing how political decision-makers are creating privileges for
individuals and groups through developing economic rents in democratic
systems (Tullock, 1967, 1999, 2005; Buchanan 1999). The technical
explanation of the economic rent is as follows: “a return to an economic
asset that exceeds the return the asset can receive in its best alternative
use” (North, etc. 2009: 19). There might be many rents without the
political interference to the economic activities in an economy, but the
rents that are interested here is all related to the political influence over
the distribution of the economic resources. The political actors can
intervene to the economic system to reallocate or redistribute the
economic resources in favor of some of individuals or groups while
preventing other individuals or groups to utilize these resources. Interest
groups in democracies (also in authoritarian regimes) often try to
influence the political decision-making processes to benefit from these
reallocation resources (Krueger, 1974).
Gordon Tullock (1967), as the first one who examines the large
social costs of the economic rents, systematically analyzed the negative
effects of the interest group activities on the political system. For
Tullock, the fundamental cost of the economic rents is not the gap
between the price of a good or service in a competitive market and the
price of a good or service in a monopolist market. Rent seeking activities
have far-reaching consequences over the political and economic system.
Rent seeking let the economic resources to be used in seeking economic
privileges rather than motivating individuals and groups to make a profit
through producing competitive goods and services. Economic rents
prevent to allocate the economic resources to efficient economic
productions and waste many productive potential by excluding the people
from the productive economic activities (Tullock, 1967: 228-232).
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In contrast to Tullock, rational choice theorists Douglass North,
J.J. Wallis and Barry  Weingast (NWW) claim that the economic rents
employ a necessary and a positive prerequisite concerning establishing
political coalitions during the first state of the formation of a political
unity. According to NWW, powerful groups that have violence potential
in emergent states may agree upon creating economic rents to stop
violence among each other and form the political order. NWW explains
the actions of the political actors in the light of economic motivations
through using methodological individualism borrowed from neo-classical
economics. Therefore, NWW assert that many different qualities of
political institutions, previously explained through examining ideological
conflicts or cultural traits of the actors, can be exposed through
examining economic motivations of the political actors. In this regard,
political history and development of political institutions in different
levels can be explained with the help of economic rents (North etc., 2009,
2012).
NWW is the only theory among the theories examined the
economic rents that provide a direct relation between the certain
properties of the political system and the scale of economic rents. In this
regard, the states that cannot establish their political unity on the rule of
law create economic rents to limit the violent conflicts among the
powerful groups. Since the main purpose of the groups in question is to
increase their economic interests, the level of economic cooperation
among these groups and properties of this cooperation determine that to
what extent and for whom the rule of law will be enforced. Thus, the
high scale of economic rents is an indicator of a low quality and
exclusive judiciary system that protects only the “rights” and economic
interests of some of the powerful groups. And, the involvement of the
larger groups in the rule of law requires a low level of economic rents.
Since a developed democracy requires an inclusive rule of law, NWW
provides conceptual tools to evaluate the democratization problems of the
countries with respect to an economic perspective. Therefore, such an
assertion directly relates the scale of economic rents to the structure of
the political system.
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This study examines the interrelations between the economic
policies and political institutionalization in the Republic of Turkey from
1923, the establishment of the Republic, to 1960, the first military coup.
The main aim of this study is to show that how democratization problems
of Turkey in the 1950s were related to the economic policies of the era,
and how these economic policies were depended on the developmental
problems of political institutions of the early years of the Republic of
Turkey. Turkey experienced a mono-party regime from 1923 to 1950,
and two attempts to transform the system into  a democratic regime were
also failed in this era. But, after the establishment of Democrat Party in
1946, Turkey had his first fair democratic election in 1950, and Turkish
political system transformed into a democratic regime. However, the
democratic elections ceased again with the military intervention in 1960.
It has been mostly claimed that the democratization problems of
Turkey were strictly related to the top-down modernization projects
which firstly stemmed from the Ottoman Empire. According to the
center-periphery theory, the cultural gap between the “center” and the
“periphery” has deepened as a consequence of the modernization project
of the Republic which, in return, has deteriorated the development of
democratic culture in Turkey (Mardin, 1973, 2000). There are also old
institutionalist explanations that relate the failure of Democrat Party’s
democratic rule to the insufficient constitutional development and weak
political institutions which failed to limit the powers of the elected
governments (Ozbudun and Genckaya, 2009). Although these theories
have a great explanatory power, the interrelation between political and
economic institutionalization has been neglected in these theories.
Marxist researches that have studied which groups have benefited from
different economic policies also have not related the scale of economic
rents to the development of political institutionalization (Keyder, 1987;
Bugra 1994). Economic history has mainly studied economic policies
with respect to the economic constraints, historical determinants, and
ideological inclinations (Boratav, 2015, Tezel, 2015; Kazgan 1999).
Therefore, how political groups have tried to protect their economic
interest through controlling political institutions has been greatly
neglected.
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In this study, in order to contribute to solving the problem
explained above, the political process from 1923 to 1960 is examined
through using conceptual tools of NWW. First, the theory of NWW is
explained, and then, NWW is applied to the historical era. The main
purpose of this study is not to construct a totally new explanation for the
historical evolution of the Republic of Turkey but to contribute to a
neglected subject area. In this regard, this study is limited to explain how
economic motivations of the political actors might have affected the
political institutionalization from 1923 to 1960.
1. NWW as a Conceptual Framework to Evaluate the Political
History
NWW employ an institutional change perspective through focusing on
power struggles over the control of the economic resources between elite
groups (North etc. 2009: 30). The theory suggests that the cost of the
violence needed for the control over the economic resources during the
development of a state, at some point, will exceed the economic benefits
of the rents. So it is logical that elite groups will make an agreement on
how to share the political power to control the violence, and eventually to
reduce the costs of the rent-seeking activities. This is called the natural
state or limited access order (LAO), as an explanation of the formation of
any pre-modern state establishment (North 2009: 32). Thus, NWW
claims that the elite oligarchy that forms the state organizations would
find the reducing the scale of rent economy in their benefit; because the
increase in productivity gained by reducing the scale of rent economy
will exceed the loss in rents.
NWW has developed a rational choice institutionalism to
understand that how the new-born states, so-called limited access orders
(LAO), might transform into liberal constitutional democracies, open
access orders (OAO) (Noth 2009: 21-5). Access refers to the openness
scale of the economic, political and social organizations to the different
potential beneficiaries in a political entity. Only a limited numbers of
groups/agents have the right to access to these organizations in LAOs
because political, economic and social institutions are formed to exclude
the outsiders to access to the wealth creation mechanisms in LAOs
(North 2009: 32). This is the fundamental political framework of the
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developing countries. However, in the developed countries, accessing to
these organizations is open to the general public. Whether a country is a
limited or an open access order can easily be detected by the scale of the
economic rents in that respective country. Because political institutions
are built to control the access to the organizations, particularly economic
organizations, to create and maintain economic rents. There might be
many rents without the political interference to the economic activities in
an economy, but the rents that NWW is interested here is all related to
the political influence over the distribution of the economic resources.
NWW also answers how power relations are evolving within the
limits of political and economic institutional developments. According to
the NWW, economic rents which are private benefits provided by public
organizations are essential to form an elite coalition who will have the
adequate motivations to build and preserve political organizations
(Wallis etc., 2010). Therefore, NWW claims that economic rents are
needed to stop or limit the violence among the powerful elite groups and
form more or less stable political organizations. Because the existential
purpose of the public organizations in developing countries is to serve to
private gains of the elite groups, normative recipes depending on the
principles of a free society are inadequate to understand the nature of the
power relations and the reform possibilities of a developing country.
Then, the fundamental question that NWW seeks to answer is that what
are the institutional choices do political elites have to decrease the scale
of the economic rents and increase the comprehensiveness of the public
goods and services.
To explain the transformation process of the LAOs, NWW
suggests a taxonomy of the LAO: fragile, basic and mature (North etc.,
2012: 21):
Fragile natural states are unable to support any
organization but the state itself. Basic natural states can
support organizations, but only within the framework
of the state. Mature natural states are able to support a
wide range of elite organizations outside the immediate
control of the state.’ Only the mature LAOs can have
the necessary institutional conditions that might lead
the country transform into an OAO.
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Thus, there might be a kind of institutional development which
will increase the organizational capacities of the state organization that
will result in reducing the scale of rents. Under ‘doorstep’ conditions, the
agreement between elite groups has a potential to start an unintended
process of transformation into a freer and a lesser rent-seeking society, or
even, an OAO (North 2009: 110). The doorstep conditions are the ‘rule
of law for elites; support for perpetually lived elite organizations
(including state), both public and private; consolidated control of
organizations with violence capacity (including military and police
force)’ (North etc. 2012: 17). An LAO with the doorstep conditions is a
mature LAO that has the potential to transform into an OAO. With the
sufficient increase in wealth and institutionalized political, economic and
social organizations, ordinary people, and other groups most probably
become more demanding regarding the privileges that elite coalition
enjoys for a long time. Moreover, at that point, suppressing all these
demands requires using violence that will undermine the doorstep
conditions of the elite coalition, which the coalition would not prefer to
do so.
2. How to Apply NWW to the Turkish Political History
The lasting effects of historical events on current political and economic
institutions are important for the theory of NWW. Although the era of
Tanzimat is important for the modernization experience of the Republic
of Turkey, effects of the capitulations are more crucial on the economic
policy preferences of Turkey. The capitulations started with reciprocal
free trade agreements between Ottoman Empire and some of the
European countries (mainly France, England, and Italy) in the middle of
17th century. But it rapidly turned into a kind of colonialist economic
practice and an alternative economic system where foreigners had several
unjust economic and legal privileges against Muslim traders and
manufacturers. The fundamental problem concerning capitulations was
not the trade deficits created as a natural consequence of the
underdeveloped industry of Ottoman Empire. But the real problem
emerged since Ottoman Empire could not reform its economic and
judicial system to provide the requirements of the modern economic
relations depended on the market economy. With the help of their
political and military advantages, European countries used the
inefficiencies of the Ottoman economic and judicial system as an excuse
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to construct their own economic system  in Ottoman Empire. Under the
capitulations, western entrepreneurs had very low tax rates compare to
the Ottoman subjects and were immune to the unpredictable emergency
levies issued frequently by the Ottoman government whenever the
government thought it was needed. And western monopolists also had
their own modern courts while Ottoman subjects had to deal with the
inefficient and out of date court system of Ottomans, the “Kadi”. Western
monopolist didn’t even have to pay the fees for the regular public
services. It was almost a kind of commercial apartheid regime. This
system was an obvious violation of the equality before the law in favor of
the Western monopolists (for a detailed account, see Kuran, 2011: 209-
227).
Leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the
modernist political elites of Ottman Empire who ruled the country from
1908 to 1918, created economic rents such as monopoly privileges and
easy credits for the Turkish entrepreneurs who were close the CUP to
fight against the detrimental economic effects of the capitulations. This
could be seen as a part of economic modernization policy that supported
the native industry through creating “indigenous bourgeoisie”. This
economic policy started at the end of the 19th century in the Ottoman
Empire was followed at least until 1980 in the Republic of Turkey
(Waterbury, 1993: 214; Keyder, 1987: 71-90; Beris: 146-170). Although
creating indigenous bourgeoisie policy could work in both open and
closed economy, traumatic effects of the capitulations supported closed
economy rather than a free trade regime. Thus, even unequal and
discriminative rules of capitulations were abolished in the Republican
era, Turkish political elites who were mostly ex-members of CUP
preferred to create economic privileges for Turkish entrepreneurs to
support economic development in Turkey (for a detailed account, Keyder
1987; Bugra, 1994; Ozturk 2008). So, it is clear that capitulations had
lasting effects on economic policies for a very long time.
The military leaders and the bureaucrats who were mostly the ex-
members of CUP passed to the Anatolia to join National Assembly for
organizing the independence war after the defeat of Ottoman Empire in
World War I. And, the Republic of Turkey has been founded under the
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk after the defeat of the Greece in the
Turkish War of Independence in 1923. Ataturk, who planned a radical
and fast modernization and secularization project for the new Turkish
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Republic, eliminated his conservative opponents to consolidate his
political power right after the Independence War. Ataturk furthered his
plan through establishing Republican People Party (RPP), and the radical
modernization initiative was started under organizations of RPP in a
mono-party regime. In 1924, another political party, Progressive
Republican Party, was established by the important military leaders as an
opposition to the RPP, but this initiative endured only eight months until
it was closed down with the charge of counter-revolutionary activities.
The Free Republican Party established upon the demand of Ataturk in
1930 was also closed down in four months. Both of these political parties
declared that they would follow much more liberal politics than the
policies of RPP. However, Turkey’s political structure was not powerful
and complex enough to carry on such liberal politics at the time (Lewis,
1961; Ahmad 1993).
The mono-party regime completed its institutionalization under
the charismatic leadership of Ataturk by 1931 (for a detailed account,
Tuncay, 1981). The  political dominant coalition known as Kemalist
elites was emerged as the institutionalization of the RPP completed. Old
military leaders turned into politicians and high-level bureaucrats had a
privileged status in this Kemalist political coalition. Kemalist coalition
rapidly acquired the ability to regulate the commercial relations,
manufactural and agricultural production to establish their control over
these economic relations. Kemalist coalition started to control the
comparatively industrialized territories and utilize the old trade relations
established by the capitulations. On the other hand, the landlords were
also connected to the central government through commercial
concessions, political privileges, and easy credit opportunities. Therefore,
relating the institutionalization of RPP to the redistribution of the
economic resources is possible through examining how the government
redistributes the economic resources among the powerful groups.
The economic history of Republic of Turkey from 1923 to 1960 is
conventionally divided into three periods (Kazgan, 1999; Boratav, 2015).
The first period is, from 1923 to 1929, called free trade era; the second
period is, from 1933 to 1947 (roughly), called import-substituting
planned economy; and the third period is, from 1950-1960, called the
mixed economy. Reasons for different economic policies in these various
periods are conventionally explained by purely economic reasons. In this
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article, however, the capacity of the political system to provide
requirements of rule of law is also examined in respect to the economic
policy preferences of Turkish governments. Thus, in this regard,
variations in economic policies can also be explained as a part of the
development of political institutions, or the political institutions of the
dominant elite coalition in Turkey.
From the perspective of NWW, Turkey experienced the fragile
LAO from 1923 to 1929. Interventionist economic policies played a
significant role to form the dominant/Kemalist coalition during these
years. However, after overcoming internal and external challenges, the
dominant coalition started to develop more elaborate and better ordered
economic and political state organizations, where all the private
(economic, social, intellectual)  organizations placed in the orbit of the
dominant coalition from 1930 to 1946. This was the period of basic LAO
in Turkey. From 1946 to 1960, Turkey witnessed a false promise of
mature LAO when an independent opposition party founded in 1946, and
the government changed through a fair election in 1950. Although the
hope did not last long, due to the significant gap between economic and
political freedom, Turkey did not regress to the fragile LOA stage after
1961 and strengthened its institutions as a basic LAO.
3. The Fragile LAO Years of Turkey, 1923-1929
The political stability was not developed on the formel rules required by
the constitutional democracy, which was needed to form peaceful
political debates, in the process from 1923 to 1929. Because of the sharp
opinion differences between the Kemalist elites and the conservative
opponents –members of the Progressive Republican Party, and the ex-
members of CUP who did not join to RPP–, the conflicts resolved
through using the coercive power of the state organizations by Kemalist
elites. The Kurdish uprisings were suppressed by the Turkish Armed
Forces (TAF) during the next two decades. Therefore, because of the
peaceful political relations could not be established in this six years
period, political stability was not built on pro-liberty impersonal rules of
law. But, the political stability shaped around personal political ties
emerged around the charisma of Ataturk. Thus, political decisions were
made in an exclusive political system rather than in a democratic political
environment where everyone has a chance to contribute to the political
International Journal of Contemporary Economics and
Administrative Sciences
ISSN: 1925 – 4423
Volume :6, Issue:3-4, Year:2016, pp. 1-30
11
decisions. From the perspective of NWW, Turkey in this stage was a
clear fragile LAO. This means that Turkish government was incapable of
supporting independent political organizations, such as another political
party or an independent intellectual club, and independent economic
organizations. In the absence of the public order generated through
impersonal rules and institutions, the political order had emerged out of
the agreement among the powerful groups. Although Kemalist coalition
eliminated the powerful groups though using both political processes and
military intervention (Ahmad 1993: 52-71; Zurcher 1991; Zurcher,
2004: 274-76; Ozkan, 2015: 341-343), examining the creation of
economic rents and redistribution of the economic resources is also
helpful to understand how the unity was achieved in the Kemalist
coalition. NWW asserts that “the distribution of economic privileges is
the key to creating incentives for stable relations within the coalition”
(North etc., 2009: 42).
Tuncay asserts that Turkey completed structuring its mono-party
regime by 1931(Tuncay, 1981). Examining the institutionalization of
RPP through economic policy preferences rather than focusing on the
ideological debates of the era help us to understand another aspect of the
RPP. From an economic rents perspective, the economic policies
concerning transportation, commerce, manufacture, banking and
agriculture helped RPP to control the economic resources, in parallel to
the political institutionalization of RPP.
The capitulations were abolished with the establishment of the
Republic of Turkey but low trade tariff rates were in practice until 1928
because of the Lozan Agreement, the founding agreement of Republic of
Turkey. Therefore, the activities of foreign traders and investors
descended from Ottoman Empire was enduring in the first years of the
Republic. The reaction of the Turkish government against foreign traders
was similar to the CUP leaders. In an underdeveloped economy and a
fragile political stability, Turkish government saw foreign traders’ power
over the economy as an obstacle both for creating indigenous bourgeois
and independent industries. Thus, the Turkish government, started to
nationalize and monopolize some of the markets, the ports and the
railways that were mostly dominated by the foreigners. Right after the
establishment of the Republic in 1923, many consumption products, such
as alcoholic beverage, explosive substances, and oil, monopolized by
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private companies. The privileged private companies had the concession
to operate the four largest ports with a direct governmental capital
transfer, but the railways nationalized by the government (Boratav, 2015:
40-41). Establishing joint ventures with foreigners was also a very
common way to attract foreign capital through the monopolizations
(Boratav, 2015: 42).
High-level public investment and economic privileges distributed
by public offices were legitimized with the lack of private entrepreneur
and native private capital. The government actively supported some of
the private enterprises, and the public enterprises and public investments
were considered as supplementary to the private economy to create an
indigenous bourgeois class in Turkey (Keyder, 1987: 71-90). Moreover,
in 1927, the Law for the Assistance of Industry (this law was also in
practice in Ottoman Empire) was passed that enabled the politicians and
bureaucrats to discriminate among the entrepreneurs by arbitrary tax
reductions, import exemptions, and subsidies (for a detailed account, see
Keyder, 1981). The total investments during the years between 1927 and
1929 were 12 percent of the GDP, and the 9 percent out of 12 was a
private investment (Owen, Pamuk, 2002: 32). But, the private
entrepreneurs were a small privileged group, and there was not an
economic environment where independent individual initiatives had the
chance to utilize economic opportunities. Thronburg (1947: 36)
summarizes this situation as follows:
What the authors mainly have in mind when they comment
on the need for the contribution which private enterprise
might make in Turkey is the existing opportunity for creative
activity on the part of Turkish citizen regarded as an
individual. There has not been much scope for the worker,
the peasant, the small trader or possessor of moderate savings
to raise his economic effectiveness or improve his status by
the application of work, ingenuity or capital to small
enterprises under personal control.
It is clear that there were not formel and informal institutions to
support free markets and individual economic initiatives in this time
period. Besides the lack of an integrated national economy, the low tariff
regime could not stop the government to regulate heavily the existing
markets and create additional monopolies. Although all these regulations
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are legitimized by economic constraints of the time, it is clear that
economic interventionism had given plenty opportunities to the political
decision makers to create economic rents. Examining the financial sector
and its relation to the manufactural and agricultural sector shows the role
of the political actors to redistribute the economic resources within the
Kemalist coalition. The most influential banks of the era were the
Agricultural Bank, exited long before the Republic, and the Is Bank, a
private bank founded by the members of the RPP including Ataturk
himself. The state-owned banks multiplied and diversified after 1934 to
govern and coordinate the planned economy. However, to understand the
nature of the relations between economic and political institutions, it is
important to explain the functions of Is Bank and Ziraat Bank, at least
briefly.
The biggest private bank, Is Bank, was founded in 1924 to
organize and finance business undertakings by political elites of the time.
Mustafa Kemal was holding a considerable amount of Is Bank shares
worth to TL 1.500.000 (28% of the total equities) (Tuncay, 2006: 148).
The executive board members of the Is Bank were also the deputies of
RPP. The first president of the Is Bank, Celal Bayar, also became the
minister of the economy in 1932, the prime minister in 1937, and finally
the president of the Turkish Republic in 1950. He was also one of the top
developers of the planned economy in Turkey. Is Bank functioned for
decades as a mediator between the state and the businessman and played
a significant financial role to redistribute the scarce financial credits and
exclusive enterprise opportunities.
Although the central area of Is Bank was finance, the bank has
established many commercial and industrial enterprises with the help of
the monopoly power and exclusive rights over many sectors, such as
glass, mining, textile and foreign trade (Ozturk, 2008: 255). The basic
strategy of the bank was to produce and to sell highly demanded
consumption goods with very high prices compare to the foreign prices
of the same goods. As early as 1928, Is Bank was holding the % 90 of the
total private bank deposits and half of the total national portfolio shares
(Ozturk, 2008: 259). Is Bank invested almost half of the total investments
made by the national banks (Ozturk, 2008: 259). Long story short, Is
Bank started many enterprises in nearly ten different branches of industry
until 1930, and multiplied and diversified its enterprises during the
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planned economy era too. The cooperation between economic state
organizations and Is Bank continued to be developed in the planned
economy years as well (Kocabasoglu, 2001).
The agricultural production was mostly controlled indirectly
through some of the state organizations. The Agricultural Bank was the
leading player in the agricultural market and its main purpose was to
promote the activities of the agricultural market players. This bank
controlled the agricultural loans directly and indirectly through some of
the semi-public organizations, such as cooperatives and credit unions.
Even though Turkey was an agricultural economy, the agricultural
market excluded the 97 percent of the farmers. 97 percent of the farms
that had 125 acres or less were only engaging in substance farming that
was outside of the agricultural market (Keyder, 1981: 13; Thornburg,
1947: 52). Because Turkey had plenty of soil with regard to its low-
density population, the small farms were not the problem for Turkish
farmers. But the main problem was the material insufficiencies that
discourage the farmers to produce to the agricultural markets. The
inadequate and poorly conditioned roads were making almost impossible
to transport the agricultural goods to the markets except for some regions
where industrial agriculture was developed beforehand in Ottoman
Empire such as the Eagen region (Boratav, 1981; Thornburg, 1947: 52).
And the lack of machinery in agricultural production decreased the
productivity level immensely. There were only five tractors in Turkey in
1927, and only the 5 percent of the cultivatable area was cultivated
during these years (Tokgoz, 2004: 86).
Thus, main users of these farm-related state organizations were
big landlords, farmers specialized in industrial agriculture and traders in
the agricultural business. These were the small organized groups who
could easily exploit opportunities supplied by the farm-related state
organizations and exclude newcomers. By 1945, the number of the
members of the agricultural credit unions was 225,000 out of the millions
of Turkish farmers (Thornburg, 1947: 60). Since the government did not
afford the costly agricultural infrastructure investments which would
have increased actors in the agricultural market, agricultural traders and
big landlords exploited the easy credits and other opportunities.
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Conventional Turkish economic history literature asserts that
when the end of the law tariff rates agreement accidently met the start of
the Great Depression in 1929, the government had no other choice to
raise the tariffs and quotas and began to think about a planned economy
dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Thus, the reasons for the
establishment of protectionism and planned economy are related to the
failure of the free trade, and the Great Depression (Boratav, 2015).
Liberals have also generated a cultural explanation through emphasizing
on the statist mentality or statist inclinations of the elites and the
bureaucrats as the source of the centrally planned economy (Beris, 2009:
29-55).
For sure there were many economic constraints to explain the
economic inefficiencies of the era, but the economic policy and the
infrastructure preferences of the government were never so much
encouraging for the ordinary citizens to produce for the markets. In this
regard, it can be assumed that there were political reasons of the
inclinations towards the development of a centrally planning economy. It
is claimed here that economic policies creating economic rents were used
as a tool to consolidate the political coalition emerging in the first years
of the Republic. Competitive markets need independent organizations
(such as companies, unions, and business associations etc.) positioned
outside of the direct control of the government. And these autonomous
organizations can only live in political systems where the rule of law is
enforced for the whole of the society. Therefore, the distribution of the
economic resources through the political decisions and the organization
to the members of the Kemalist coalition rather than investing in
infrastructure to promote the productivity of the ordinary people was the
most reasonable choice for the political elites at the time.
4. Strengthening the Basic LAO Through Protectionism and Central
Planning, 1930-1946
Turkish government raised the tariff rates from 13 percent to 46 percent
after the restrictive clause of the Lozan Agreement ended in 1929 and
started the import-substituting industrialization policies in Turkey
(Boratav, 1981, 2015; Owen, Pamuk, 2002). And, with the financial and
technical help of Soviet Russia, Turkey tried the economic statism by
Kalkan / Political Institutionalization and Economic Rents: The Case of Turkey from
1923 to 1960
www.ijceas.com
16
implementing its first five-year economic planning program in 1934.
Even though the economic planning program was far away from being
systematic and consistent, the state had a great influence over the
economy because of the nationalization of the heavy industry and mining
sector.
The protectionism and the planned economy preferences of the
government are mostly explained by the economic constraints and the
desire for a fast industrialization. The free trade era (1923-1929) created
great trade deficits that deteriorated the monetary stability, and the
domination of the foreign investors in the economy could not be ended.
And, the financial incentives and the economic privileges provided by the
governmental agencies could not start the fast industrialization process
that the political elites desired most. The decrease in income collected
from the agricultural products during the Great Depression in 1929
exposed the uncontrollable structure of the economic growth depended
on the foreign trade. Therefore, all these factors are shown as the reasons
for RPP to start protectionism and planned economy program for
achieving fast industrialization (Boratav, 1981: 170-175).
However, these pure economic reasons for the policy change are
incomplete for not relating the political actors’ economic motivations to
the institutionalization level of the political system. Considering the fact
that high trade tariff rates started to plan in 1925, the only reason for the
protectionist policies could not be the Great Depression and the trade
deficits (Boratav, 1981: 170). The most dangerous aspect of the free trade
regime for the fragile political regimes is that free trade greatly decreases
the control of the political actors over the economic resources. Even
though economic productivity is low in a closed economy, it is easier for
the political elites to determine the economic targets and direct the
economic actors according to the governmental plans. Moreover, the
scarcity created in a closed economy provides many opportunities to
form economic rents, and it is easy for the political decision makers to
determine who will be the beneficiary of these economic rents.
As a matter of fact, the high scale of economic rents created by
economic interventionism mostly depended on selling many consumption
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goods with higher prices than the overseas prices of the same goods.
Sumerbank, a huge state-owned monopolist in manufacture industry
established in 1933, was an interesting case concerning exploiting
economic rents through higher prices. Private mills were selling one yard
of cotton fabric at 20 cents to Sumerbank, and the Sumerbank was selling
it to the public at 40 cents a yard. The exported cotton fabric was 25 cent
a yard but public did not have the opportunity to buy the exported goods.
Furthermore, the activities of the Sumerbank, the sole buyer of the cotton
fabrics, was making it very difficult to open new private mills. Because
the new technical equipment was very expensive and the future of the
sector was unpredictable, there were not much private investment to the
new mills (Thronburg, 1947: 116).
Another good example was that General Administration of State
Monopolies. Under the management of this monopoly administration
many consumption goods –such as tobacco, alcohol, coffee, tea, sugar,
clothes, gunpowder– were both produced and sold on a very large scale.
If the prices of those goods would have been cheaper than the exported
goods, then one could have claimed that it was populist economic policy.
But the prices were mostly higher than the exported goods, and the
government was using these monopolies to raise revenues mostly to
transfer resources to the ineffective industrialization projects. State-
owned monopolies limited to open small-scale private enterprises, and
big private investments were totally depended on governmental
permission and financial support. With the protectionist policies,
importation of goods was also given as a concession to the some of the
big traders and industrialists (Keyder, 1987: 142). After the
nationalization of the transportation and the mining companies owned by
foreigners in the 1930s, Kemalist coalition got the control of all the
important economic resources in Turkey.
Although the public investments surpassed the private
investments in this era, it was not an essential threat to some of the
privileged private enterprises. The public investments were heavily
directed to the railway construction and the heavy industries which were
producing intermediate goods for private and state-owned manufactories.
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Therefore, economic planning was also supported the growth of some of
the private industries. However, this private sector growth was developed
in the direction showed by the political actors, and the beneficiaries of
this system were also determined by the political decision-makers.
Examining the interrelations among the member groups of the
Kemalist coalition would better clarify the consequences of the planned
economy. As the planned economy with SOEs expanded, the political
influence and the wealth of bureaucrats/politicians and their industrial
“entrepreneur” friends increased very fast. 74 percent of the founders of
the new private enterprises had worked as a civil servant before they
decided to change their occupation between the years from 1931 to 1940
(Bugra, 1994: 58). SOEs were producing raw materials and intermediate
items as inputs for the privileged private companies, and those private
companies were producing consumption goods in mostly monopolized
markets. Export-oriented traders, both Turkish citizens and foreigners,
were relatively a small group in the coalition, and their business totally
depended on their relations with the “state”. The source of wealth of one
of the largest conglomerates of the Turkey today, such as Koc, Sabanci,
and Cukurova, can be traced back to the governmental tenders in the
1930s (Ozturk, 2008). The so-called indigenous bourgeoisies of the era
were a small minority who ‘enjoyed tariff protection and oligopolies
markets, cheap inputs from state-owned enterprises, government
contracts, and preferential credit’ (Waterbury 1993: 214). Finally, the big
farmers/landlords, only the one percent of the whole peasants, have
economic power and traditional influence over their local people and
have political power through Assembly and local state agencies. This
somewhat small but relatively wealthy group did not have many options
rather stay in Kemalist coalition in return for mostly the concessions for
agricultural product trade, tax reductions, and easy bank credits.
In the light of these explanations, it is clear that there was no
political and economic organization orbited outside of the Kemalist
coalition from 1930 to end of WWII. Even though Ataturk ordered his
loyal friend Ali Fethi to establish another political party –Free
Republican Party– as an opposition group to change the appearance of
the mono-party regime in 1930, RPP had to close down the Party very
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fast, because of the fragility of the political stability. But with the total
control over the economic resources, RPP developed much more stable
and well-ordered political system until the beginning of the WWII. This
era can easily be named as basic LAO from the perspective of NWW.
However, with the huge difficulties created by the WWII, the political
stability was threatened by the economic inefficiencies that were a result
of cumulative effects of protectionism and economic planning.
Therefore, it is important to examine the establishment of DP in 1946 and
political conflicts experienced after the WWII through relating the
problems of economic inefficiencies to the properties of the political
institutions of the era.
5. The Crisis of the Basic LAO: Second World War and the Need for
Economic Liberalization, 1946-1950
The planned economy in Turkey was basically a rent creating a
mechanism that served various and sometimes conflicting goals of the
different players in the state sector, such as bureaucrats, managers of the
SOEs, politicians, and the businessmen. Every player acted rationally
within the choice structure that was open to them, but the consequences
seemed irrational in regard to the declared aims of the planned economy.
Even though economic rents created a more or less stable political
system, it was also a deadweight loss for the whole society, especially for
the poor peasants. Turkey’s average growth rate of 9.1% from 1933 to
1939, but Turkey was away from sustaining the basic needs of her
citizens (for a detailed account see, Tezel, 2015: 600-603).
Mismanagement of SOEs, high prices of consumption goods in the
closed economy, crowding out effects of the state monopolies, political
corruption, greatly insufficient infrastructure investments, and
deteriorated price mechanism were just some of the reasons for the
failure of the planned economy in Turkey (Waterbury, 1993: 107-134).
Turkey managed to stay out of the war but the conditions created
by the WWII were enough to shake the dominant coalition to reform the
political system in order to improve the economic efficiency. With the
start of the war, the export revenues fell considerably, and the Turkish
Armed Forces drafted half of the men who were working as farmer
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before the war. And some of the men forced to work for the SOEs and to
do public work. While the poverty was increasing so fast in the rural
areas, hoarding and black-marketing were enlarging with the growth of
scarcity in the cities. Most of the businessmen who had access to the
agricultural products and scare exported goods made a huge amount of
money incorporation with the many high-level civil servants, such as city
governors (Zurcher, 2004: 199-200).
The government started to confiscate the businesses, fixed the
prices of many goods and introduce ration card for basic consumption
goods. Apparently, the government could not handle with the black-
marketing and hoarding, even though the government equipped with the
brutal laws like Martial Law. A hate speech against businessmen,
especially the non-Muslim businessmen, promoted by the government,
and eventually, the infamous Wealth Levy declared to collect money
from the rich businessmen over their total wealth from 1942 to 1944.
Non-muslims forced to pay half of their total wealth while Muslims paid
12.5 percent of their total wealth (Cetinoglu, 2012). Because the Wealth
Levy Law required the payment in two weeks, most of the non-muslims
sold their wealth to Muslims under the market prices. Taxpayers who
could not pay were sent to the labor camps while Is Bank was providing
easy loans to powerful Muslim businessmen to pay their due, and even,
to exploit the new opportunities created by the WL (Ozturk, 2008: 149).
Although Muslim businessmen with good political connections
exploited the opportunities of the wartime to a great extent, the actions of
the government became increasingly unpredictable and the revenues of
the economic rents were decreasing with the economy in recession. The
relation between the authoritarian bureaucrats and politicians of RPP and
the businessmen and landlords were tense. But the agreement among the
dominant coalition was jeopardized when the government offered a law
to distribute the land to the landless peasants in 1945. Although Turkey
had plenty of unused lands owned by the state, the law also offered to
distribute the private lands bigger than 1235 acres (Karpat, 1959: 117-
118). This was an open declaration of war of the government against
landlords. And the law also made many businessmen uncomfortable
because the “hatred speech” seemed like extended to the wealthy
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Muslims too. Organized violence and confiscation were the two tools of
the state to cope with economic crisis and the social unrest. But when
these tools started to threaten the two powerful elite groups, they
triggered a great political opposition movement in the Assembly, which
was immediately and easily integrated with the various opposition groups
outside of the Assembly (Karpat, 1959: 124).
NWW implies that economic liberalization stemmed from the
domestic power relations as a requirement for the sustainability of the
dominant coalition. The political system was deprived of the minimum
economic efficiency to be able to sustain itself at the end of the WWII.
First, despite the prevalent coercive power of the state, the government
had great difficulties to control the social unrest both in cities and in
counties. This increased the possibility of the rise of organized violence
that would be out of control of the government all over Turkey. Second,
economic recession decreased the revenues of economic rents and the
private capital owners started to look at new investment opportunities
that were generally sized by the SOEs or in control of the state
organizations. To avoid a violent struggle in the dominant coalition, new
markets should have opened to the elites. But the government during the
WWII increased its economic interventionism in scale and threatened the
property rights of the elite groups. Under these circumstances, a limited
economic and political liberalization was in favor of the dominant
coalition, even for the bureaucrats. Furthermore, the military
bureaucracy, especially the young officers, was also strongly supporting
this kind of liberalization. Because, becoming a part of the NATO meant
the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces and more budgetary
funds for the military-national security spending (for a detailed account,
see Hale, 1994).
6. The Fake Hope of a Mature LAO, 1950-1960
The opposition against RPP among the ordinary people raised
dramatically, and the distrust of the landlords and the big industrialist
against RPP was grown during the WWII. Under these domestic
circumstances, when the US supports for the transition of Turkey into a
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democratic regime coincided with the Soviet Russia’s threat over Turkey,
the proper political conditions for the establishment of an opposition
party was emerged (Karpat, 1959; Ahmad, 1977; Vanderlippe, 2005).
Democrat Party (DP) was founded by the pro-business economy
supporter Celal Bayar and the landlord Adnan Menderes right after the
WWII. DP that attracted great public support right after its establishment
took over the political power through the winning the first fair elections
in 1950. DP, that had a comparatively successful first term (1951-1954)
regarding the economic and political liberalization, was dragged into
economic and political crisis in its second term (1954-1957). And finally,
DP was overthrown by a military coup in 1960, and the prime minister
Menderes was hanged with a charge of political corruption.
It is an interesting and important political experience that a mono-
party regime in the Middle East peacefully accepted the democratic
elections. However, examining the composition of the members of the
DP makes it easier to understand this democratic transition. The founders
and the important members of DP were ex-members of RPP. Thus,
interpreting DP as a new elite coalition is misleading, but explaining DP
as a change in the leadership of the dominant coalition is closer to the
reality. Furthermore, the democratic system did not allow a third party to
flourish. In this regard, it was a limited democratic race.
It is also possible to examine the reasons this important but failed
democratic experience from the perspective of NWW. According to the
NWW, democracy was mostly an unintended consequence of the
doorstep conditions in a mature LAO. Democracy persists when rejecting
the demands of the rights of the ordinary people can be more costly than
accepting them for the dominant coalition (North etc., 2009: 25-27).
However, Turkey was far away from the conditions of the mature LAO at
the end of the 1940s. Kemalist coalition could not adequately establish
the rule of law for the group members; both state and the private
organizations were being run through personal ties and relations;
charismatic war leaders who turned into politicians after the LWT were
facilitating the relations between ‘civil’ government with the armed
forces.
The political promises of DP and the institutional capacity of the
state were totally in contradiction with each other. DP declared to
promote entrepreneurship through privatizing the SOEs; to decrease the
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tariffs and quotas to establish free foreign trade; to invite the foreign
investment in Turkey to increase industrial development (Dogan, 1957).
DP also promised to improve the public goods and services that people in
the rural areas could benefit more. Furthermore, DP declared that the
Party was respectful towards religious beliefs which were under heavy
pressure because of the secularization programs of RPP. All these claims
require a mature LAO. As discussed earlier, becoming a mature LAO
means that the private organizations (such as economic, political and
religious) can place outside the orbit of the government. Thus the general
public can enjoy most of the public goods and services, and the
government (executive, legislative and judiciary) must be sophisticated
and autonomous enough to keep its commitments concerning the rights
of these organizations outside of the dominant coalition (North etc.,
2009: 21; North etc., 2012: 14).
It is not difficult to understand the lack of such incentives to form
a mature LAO among the elites, especially elites of DP. The Turkish
economy was a massive rent creation mechanism dominated by the SOEs
and monopolized markets. Moreover, the reformers of DP were still
among the beneficiaries of that system. The most important difference
that mattered concerning the economic policy between DP and RPP was
that DP became the platform to recruit new elites to the dominant
coalition with the acceptance of the election system. However, the claim
to institutionalize a national free market economy and the political
freedom implied that they had to give up many of their vested interests.
Of course, these implications were totally a contradiction with the aims
of the elites of DP. Although DP mostly stopped to invest in SOEs to
improve the infrastructure and facilitate the development of a national
economy, DP did not achieve to build a competitive market economy
(Erdem etc., 2009: 9-26). As NWW predicts, however, some of the
public services, such as healthcare, improved rapidly. The statistics show
that the extent of the public services increased substantially in compare to
the mono-party regime (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2007).
Although the DP area is seen as the beginning of economic
liberalization, the difference between DP and RPP in regard to their
relative economic policy was a matter of degree, not of kind. DP
governments were clearly pro-business, but not pro-free market for the
most of the time. Despite a limited economic openness, DP also
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continued to employ the import-substituting industries as its primary
strategy in economic policy. However, this time, private entrepreneurs
played a greater role in compare to RPP era. With the decrease in the
scale of economic rents, the number of the businesses raised 47 percent,
and the private sector grew its production 340 percent while the increase
in public sector stayed 130 percent in the first four years of DP era.
Employment volume also increased 33 percent, mostly due to the growth
in private business (Erdem etc., 2009: 13). A considerable number of
Turkish holdings established during these years. Therefore, the scale of
the economic rents reduced to a level where the main rent creating
mechanism was not got hurt, but the number of the economic rent users
increased immensely.
The fast increase in economic rent users created two main
problems, one for DP and the other for RPP. Although DP achieved high
growth rates in the first years of its rule, this economic boom was mostly
a product of monetary expansion that was not constrained by market
discipline, and the post-war foreign trade boom. And, because of the high
scale of rent creation and deteriorated market signaling, the growth was
so fragile. For example, when Turkey had a bad agricultural product
because of the weather conditions, an economic crisis raised immediately
because of the trade balance deficit and the scarcity in the country in
1953. The foreign currency scarcity as a consequence of the fixed
currency regime and subsidized exportation were also good examples of
fragilities of the economy during DP governments (Owen&Pamuk: 146-
147). DP even started to fix prices and ration coupons to deal with the
scarcity and hoarding after 1953.
RPP and opposing media increasingly criticized the government
for its economic failures, especially after 1953 when the first economic
bust occurred. Because DP did not have the power to reduce the
economic rents, the best response to the opposition groups was use
coercive power to silence them (Ahmad, 1993: 117). DP even
confiscated some of the properties of RPP and tried to restrict the
freedom of association as much as possible. Therefore, after three years
of the peaceful transition to “democracy”, DP started to use similar
coercive power used by RPP against opposition groups. Therefore, DP’s
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economic policy was so influential on its other policies concerning civil
liberties and its political attitudes.
With the increasingly deteriorating economic conditions, DP
started to lose not only the old big business groups but also the educated
people and the bureaucrats in the cities. However, the fatal group that
stopped to support DP was the middle-rank military officers (MROs),
mostly composed of colonels and the captains in Turkish Armed Forces.
There was a conflict between the middle-rank officers who were the
product of the modern military education and the old school generals of
Turkish Armed Forces (William 1994, 100-4). While generals of Turkish
Armed Forces had several economic and political privileges granted by
DP, the social status of MROs was declining in compare to the new
merchant class of DP because of the rising inflation rates. Besides that,
MROs saw the old generals as an obstacle in front of the modernization
of Turkish Armed Forces and their promotion. After joining the NATO,
these MROs had many opportunities to notice the weakness and
backwardness of TAF more clearly. Moreover, eventually, the military
coup was organized by these MROs (Bayramoglu, 2004: 74-77; Akca,
2004).
When DP and its defenders increasingly lost the support of the
other elite groups in the dominant coalition, DP frequently used arbitrary,
coercive power against all kind of oppositions, with the fear of a coup
against the government. Turkish Armed Forces, however, was holding
the ultimate violence capacity, not the government. On 27 May 1960,
Turkish Armed Forces declared that they overthrew the authoritarian
government to restore the democratic rule and to secure the rights of the
people. Therefore, unfortunately, the peaceful transition to democratic
rule in Turkey ceased with military intervention. For sure, the literature
on the reasons for this military coup is very advanced (Karpat, 1954,
2004; Ozbudun&Faruk, 2009) but, it is fair to claim that the economic
inefficiencies created by the high-level economic rents had great
influence over the democratic institutionalization problems of the DP era.
Conclusion
The economic policies of a state are never determined only with regard to
its economic constraints. The properties of the political institutions
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provide serious limitations over the kind of economic policies that can be
applied. The stable economic growth is only possible if the state can
incorporate a large number of individuals and groups in production
processes to utilize their productive capacity. This kind of economic
growth is strictly related to the recognition and the protection the rights,
especially the economic freedoms of the people, by the state. It is not
possible for a state to institutionalize a competitive market economy
without having an independent judiciary and neutral bureaucratic
organizations. For sure, political ideologies and cultural practices have a
large influence over politics and economics. However, these factors do
not change the fact that political actors also motivated by their economic
interests.
Besides the ideological and cultural explanations, one can assert
that the economic policies were the result of the requirements needed to
support the political unity and political development rather than the
economic constraints, from the first years of the Republic to the first
military coup in 1960. While Kemalist coalition was struggling for the
political power, they were also trying to increase their control over the
economic resources. Although Kemalist coalition was organized enough
to keep resources under control during the economic planning years, they
could not have sufficiently improved the capacity of the political
organizations to cope with the economic inefficiencies caused by the
high scale of economic rents.
RPP could not have unified Turkey which was fragmented into
regions that were almost without any economic connections around a
national economy from 1923 to the beginning of WWII. Because high
scale of economic rents decreased the investment in infrastructure to
unify Turkey as a national economy, ordinary citizens did not have the
opportunity and the motivation to contribute to the economic productivity
as an economic actor through market relations. Due to the economic
policies that excluded a large number of people for a considerably long
time, economic relations were developed through personal relations
rather than legal rights and formel rules. The extreme difficulties created
by the WWII changed the agreements among the elite groups in the
Kemalist coalition, and Turkey transformed into democracy without the
development of political and economic relations that a democratic regime
based on.
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For sure, the democratic election system is not a panacea that
solves every political problem. Political freedom can destabilize the
economy where the fundamental economic decisions are made by
politicians and interest groups. The declared comprehensive economic
liberalization program of the DP was not flourished because leaders of
DP were among the beneficiaries of the economic rents that they were
supposed to destroy, and the political relations were not designed to
sustain impersonal economic relations in a  market economy. If the
economic growth and the resource allocation and distribution were
satisfactory enough for the elite groups in the dominant coalition during
the DP rule, the number of the groups that supported the military coup in
1960 would be decreased notably. To put it another way, if DP had
achieved a sustainable economic growth and political development
through decreasing the scale of economic rents  and improving the rule of
law, more elite groups would have supported their rule.
Today, the rent-seeking activities are still playing a great role in
Turkish democracy that slow down the development of the conditions of
a mature LAO. As a matter of fact, the political conflicts experienced
during the DP era and the economic and the political institutions of the
early Republic that set the stage for these conflicts are still effective over
the political system of Turkey.
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